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RIGID PRICING POLICIES AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION 
J. M. Heineke & C. Fethke 
In this paper we present a model of a •profit maximizing fi rm in which one price is set for the entire mul tiperiod 
planning horizon . One of the consequences of such a pricing policy, if one employs widely used assumptions about 
demand and cost functions, is a decision rule for choosing the optimal price which may be inte rpreted as the " full -cost" 
pricing equation of much recent controversy. The significance of this result lies in the fact that full -cost pricing and profit 
maximization h ave often been held to be inconsis tent) In addition, this model integrates the pricing decision with the 
other decisions taken by the firm . 
Introductory Remarks 
Our model takes U1e fi rm to be confronting a T period planning horizon and acting to max1m1ze the discounted 
stream of profits over the horizon . The ra tionale for a rigid pricing policy is of course, the existence of cos ts associated 
with changing price. These costs may be ch arges affiliated with publishing new price listings, brochures and cataloges, as 
weU as the add itional sales effort needed to "explain" the price changes to established buyers. In oligopoly they may take 
the form of an added dimension of uncertainty which arises when price is changed. Empirical investigations regarding the 
pricing po licies of apparen tly effectively colluding oligopolists have frequently ·indicated that product price changes in 
respon se to sho rt-run fluc tuations in demand and cost are avoided , with price remaining constant o ften for extended 
periods of time.2 A number of reasons are presented for rigid pricing p olicies in such industries, with major emphasis 
placed on uncertainty regarding reac tions of rivals to price changes . If a price increase by a single oligopolist is not 
followed , the loss in market share and goodwill can indeed be significant. Further, while a competitive firm cannot 
influence present or future demand , the oligopolist h as more discretion and is often depicted as viewing price in a longer 
term perspect ive. 
Variants of the rigid pncmg policy have been employed by a numbe r of authors in an a ttemp t to " explajn" the 
pricing policies of imperfect ly compe titive fi rms.3 An often used assump tion is that firms price by apply ing a standard 
markup to mate rial and labor costs. With this "full cost" pricing scheme, price will respond to changes in the cost of 
1 For a good rev iew of the debate see, 1{. B. Hefle bower, "Full Costs, Cos t Changes, and Prices," in Business Conce11tration and Price 
Policy, a report of the Na tional Bureau o f Econom ic Research , Princeto n Univers ity Press, 1955, p . 36 1- 9 6. 
2A classic study is th a t of R . L. Hall and C. J. Hitch , '' Price Theory and Business Behavior," Oxford Economic Papers, No.2, 1939 . Also 
see A. D. N. Kaplan , J. B. Dirlan and R. F. Lanzilotti, Pricing in Big Business - A Case A pproach , Bro ok ings Ins titution , 1958; and R. F . 
Lanzilotti , 'Pricin g O bjectives of Large Co m panies, " American Economic R eview, December 1958. 
3A I' . omoted selection of sources in clude : Hearings, Before the S ubcom mittee on A ntitrltSt and Monopoly of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 85th 
Congress, 1st Session, Part 1: Opening Phase - Econom ist s' V iews, Government Prin t ing Office, 1957; Gardner Ackely, "A Third Appro ach 
10 the Analysis an d Cont rol oi Infla tion ," in The R e lationsloip of Prices ro Economic Stability and Gro wth; Com pendium of Papers 
Submitted by Panelists, pp . 6 19 -36 , C. L. Schult ze, Prices, Costs and Output in the Postwar Decade, Com mittee for Econo mic 
Development , 1960; C. L. Sch ultze, "Uses o f Capacity Measures for Shor t Run Econo mic Analysis ," A merican Economic Review, Pa pers 
and ~roceedings, May 1963, pp. 295 - 96; Otto Eckstein , "A T heor y of Wage-Price Process in Mo dern Indust ry," Review of Economic 
Studoes, October 1964, pp. 267 - 86: and O tto Ecks tein and Gary Fro mm , " The Price Equatio n," American Econo mic Review, December 
l 968, pp . I I 64-66. ' 
Dr. Heineke (Ph.D., University of Iowa) is Assistant Professor of Economics a t the University of Santa Clara. His 
publica tions appeared in The American Economist, Review of Economics and Statistics, and Santa Clara Business Review. 
Dr. Fethke (Ph .D., University of Iowa) is Assistan t Professor of Economics at Bradley University . 
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producing "standard" or " normal" output , e ither because of changes in input prices or techno logy , but will not be 
adjusted for short term fluctuations in demand or costs. The markup is usually considered dependent in some unspecified 
fashion on industry structural fa ctors such as barriers to entry, concentration, product di fferen tiation, etc. 
There are a number of apparent defic iencies in pricing rules which derive from a " full cost" formulation or its 
variant, the target rate of re turn on investment criterion . First , such pricing techniques fail to take explici t accoun t of 
demand elasticities or the size of marginal , rather than average, costs. Second, the " full cost" criteria are often revealed as 
ad hoc relations derived from questionnaires posed to businessmen familiar with pricing procedures - a method wh ich has 
been repeatedly challenged.4 Third, many investigations of oligopolistic pricing fail to integrate the price decision with 
related decisions involving inventory policy and backlogging of orders, even though rigid prices over time imply a 
transference of at least part of intertemporal rationing to nonprice variables.s For example , in the lite rature of 
management science and operations research , price is frequently take n as exogenously determined with the rate of 
inventory accumulation (production) selected on the basis of a given time path of expected sales.6 This approach , while 
suitable fo r particular decision problems, is unacceptable if price and inventory are viewed as interdependent decisions. 
Granted that many econometric studies o f oligopolistic pricing add inventory and backlogged order variables to a specific 
price equation , li ttle work has been done towards specificat ion and es timation of a model in which price, inventory and 
backlogged orders are simultaneously determined decision variables of an imperfectly competitive firm. 
The model presented in this paper eliminates each of these deficiencies. The decision rules of the model instruct the 
entrepreneur to se t one price for the entire horizon, that price being equal to the marginal cost of "standard" or 
' normal" output, plus a markup which varies inversely with the elasticity of demand. In addition , the decisions of the 
firm are completely integrated as price, inventory holdings and orde r backloggs are simultaneously dete rmined from the 
derived decision rules. 
The Model 
The following defini tions will be used : 
st = sales in period t , 0 < st 
ct production in period t , 0 < q t 
x t = net inventory holdings in period t , - CIO < xt < CIO 
p = the price chosen for the T period horizon , 0 < P 
0 = the discount ra te, 0 :5 o $ I 
1( the discounted stream of profits 
C(qt) = the cost associated wi th q1 units of production 
g(qrqt_1) = the cost associated wi th changing the production rate from qt-l to qt. 
<l>(x1) = the cost associated with holding xt units of inventory 
{ 
I(xt) , x t > 0 
I/J(x1) , x t < 0 
4 1n sho rt , the o pinio n o f the businessman is not conside red to carry m uch weight in the evalua tion of o bjective economic func tions, since 
businessmen are unlike ly to thin k in the language of a n econo mist . Often eviden ce is sum m arized fro m accounting da ta h aving little to do 
with econo mic concepts . Friedman , e .g. , a rgues that ·• ... the answers by businessmen to q uestions abou t the factors affec t ing thetr 
decisio ns .. . is abo ut o n a par with testing theo ries of longevit y by asking octogenarians h ow they account for their long life . . . ," Essays 
in Positive Economics, Univers it y o f Chicago Press, 1966, p . 3 1. For a review o f the criticisms relating to the q uest ionn aire approach see, 
Fritz Machi up , 'Margin al Analysis and Empirical Research ," Am erican Economic Review, Sept. 1966, pp . 135 - 4 8 , esp . Sec. 2. 
5 tn a somewh at diffe rent contex t, the work of Edwin Mills attemp ts such an integrat io n . See , Price, Outpu t and In ventory Policy , Jo.hn 
Wiley & Sons , 1962. Also, A. J. Nevins , "Some Effects o f Uncerta inty: Simulatio n of a Mode l o f Price, " Quarterly Journal of EconomiCS, 
Fe b. 1966, pp. 73 - 87. 
6s~e. K. Arrow, S. Karlin , and H. Scarf, Studies in the Mathematical Theory of Inventory and Production , Stanfo rd Universit y Press, 1958, 
or C. Holt , F . Modiglian i, J. Muth and H. Simo n , Planning, Production , Inventory and Work Force, Pren tice-Hall , 19 60. 
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¢(xt) is then the function which ass igns the cost to intertemporal transportation of production. l(xt) is inventory 
storage cost; lj;(x1) is the cost of backlogging orders. 
As noted above, the model to be presented presupposes the existence of costs which make it desirable to set one 
price for the en tire planning horizon. In such a case, 
where ft(St) denotes the demand function in period t and llt and \ are undetermined Lagrangean multipliers in period t. 
Necessary conditions for a maximum are:1 
(2) t= I ,2, ... , T , 
(3) t=I ,2, ... , T, 
(4) t=l,2, ... , T-I 
(5) 
(6) t= I ,2, ... , T, and 
(7) t=I ,2, ... , T. 
Substitution of (3) in to (2) and (4), and then (2) into (5) y ields 
(8) 
(9) 
T ~ ot-I [St · f((St) + P-C 1(qt) -g '(qt-qt_1)+ og'(qt+I-q1) ] /f{(S1) = 0 , and 1 
-<P '(~)-c'(qt)+oc 'Cqt+l) - g'(qcqt-J) + 2 og'(qt+I-qt) - 02g'(qt+Tqt+I) = o, 
t= I ,2, ... , T -1. 
Equations ( 6), (7), (8) and (9) are 3T equations in 3T+ 1 variables.8 Given "well behaved" functions, specification of xT 
allows solution. According to equation (8) the price selected for the entire T periods is chosen such that the discounted 
sum of revenue changes, due to a price change, is equal to the discounted sum of changes in costs, due to a price change, 
with the summation taken over the entire T period planning horizon. Equations (9) indicate the optimal amount of 
inventory (backlogged orders) in period t is that quantity such that marginal inventory cost equals the discounted change 
in marginal production costs between periods t and t+ I plus the discounted changed in marginal costs associated with 
production rate changes between periods t and t+ 1. 
As we saw in the preceeding paragraph, equations (8) and (9) have straigh tforward interpretations as they stand . 
Nevertheless, it is of some interest to assume the functions in these equations may be adequately approximated with 
quadratic funct ions and then take another look at the decision rules. We choose to approximate these functions because 
in pra ctice they are approximated - with quadratics being overwhelmingly the most popular approximating 
function9 - and it may well be the case that some of the alleged discrepancies between observed pricing policies and the 
7We assume 1r is convex. 
: Here x0 and q 0 are data. The value of production in the first period of the ne xt hori zon, qT+I' must be assigned. 
For exam ple see, C. Holt et. al., op. cit., especially chapters 3 - 6. This book is directed to deriving operational optimal decision rules for 
the firm and quadratic approximations are used throughout. 
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pricing policies predicted by economic models stem from the fact that in practice the class of convex functions used by 
economists is much to broad to allow estimation , and that managers approximate these functions with families of curves f 
dependent upon only a sma ll number of parameters .! 0 The consequence of such action would be the specialization of the r 
firm's decision rules into a form which may, at first glance, seem inconsistent with the more general rules de rived by 
economists, but which in fact are not. We are not suggesting that all, or even most , managers explicitly make quadratic 
approximations, but rather that many "rule of thumb" decision rules may reflect implicit assumptions about the form of 
the relevant functions. In what follows, we will focus our attention on equation (8), due to the long standing controversy 
over the pricing equation. 
We now assume revenue and cost functions are quadratic. Specifically: 
(12) ¢(xt) = ex? , c > 0 and 
where at is a shift parameter in the two dimensional demand function in period t. Hence ft(St) instead of f(St) . We also 
assume o = 1. Since this model is concerned with the short term decisions of the firm, such an assumption seems 
relatively innocuous. 
Equation (8) is now 
where S and q are the average production and sales rates over the horizon. Since a 1 = f;(St), the left hand side of (8 ) is 
the marginal revenue associated with the average sales rate; b
0 
+2b 1 q is the marginal cost of the average production rate . 
Letting 77 = - (dS/dP) (P/S) equation (81 ) becomes 
The last term of (8 11 ) becomes insignificant for large values of T and may be ignored, Therefore, if a rigid pricing 
policy is pursued and if managers approximate cost and revenue functions with quadratics, price is set equal to the 
marginal cost of the average production rate plus a "markup" which varies inversely with the elasticity of demand at the 
average sales rate. One could easily interpret q as the "standard output" rate in which case price is fixed to equal the 
marginal cost associated with the standard output plus a markup . 
In summary, not only is the "full costing" equation a natural consequence of profit maximization in this model, but 
also since the values of all decision variab les are determined simultaneously by equations (6)- (9) the pricing decision is 
integrated wi th the other decisions of the firm. 
10 A small selection of articles addressing this a lleged discrepancy follows: R. Hall and C. Hitch, o p. cit., R. A. Lester, "Shortcomings of 
Marginal Analysis for Wage-Employment Problems," American Economic Review, March , 1946, p. 63, F. Mach lup , o p. cit. , R. A. Gordon , 
·'Short·Period Price De termination in Theory and Practice," American Economic Review, June, 1948, p . 265, and J. S. Ear ly, "Marginal 
Pol icies o f Excellently Managed Co mpanies," American Economic Review, March, 1956, p. 44. 
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